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EMPLOYER SOLICITATION OF SEXUAL FAVORS
FROM EMPLOYEES: SEX DISCRIMINATION
UNDER TITLE VII OF THE CIVIL
RIGHTS ACT OF 1964
Women have traditionally been underrepresented in the managerial
labor force. Whereas approximately one man out of seven occupies an
administrative position, only one woman out of twenty holds a similar
job.' In the workplace hierarchy, a man will often be the supervisor
and a woman will be his subordinate.2 If unsolicited sexual advances
are made by the man and rejected by the woman, he will frequently
have the authority to deny a promotion or to effect a discharge or
transfer. 3 In Williams v. Saxbe,4 the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that sex discrimination under Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 19641 occurs when an employer retaliates against an
employee because she refuses to comply with his demands for sexual
favors.
Plaintiff, a female civil service employee, brought an action under
Title VII alleging that her supervisor terminated her employment be-
cause she declined his sexual advances. 6 Affirming the hearing offi-
1. DEP'T OF LAB. 1974 HANDBOOK ON WOMEN WORKERS, (WOMEN'S BUREAU BULL.
No. 294) at 86.
2. The composition of the Federal Civil Service mirrors this trend. Approximately
96.5% of all white collar civil service employees assigned to a general schedule grade
higher than 13 are male. Grades 10-13 are comprised of a population that is 90.6% male.
Included in grades 5 and below are 67 men and 33 women for every 100 employees. U.S.
CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N, STUDY OF WOMEN IN THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT, 1972, Table
II-B, at 163.
3. Barnes v. Costle, 15 FEP Cases 347 (D.C. Cir. 1977); Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976); contra, Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp.
553 (D.N.J. 1976); Miller v. Bank of Am., 418 F. Supp. 223 (N.D. Cal. 1976); Come v.
Bausch and Lomb, Inc., 390 F. Supp. 161 (D. Ariz. 1975). Interview with Susan Spiegel,
Ass't Director of the Employment Rights Project, St. Louis University School of Law,
St. Louis, Mo.
4. 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
5. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970), as amended, The Equal Employment Oppor-
tunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1974).
6. 413 F. Supp. at 655-56.
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cer's finding7 that her discharge was motivated by non-employment
related factors, 8 the court held that "willingness to furnish sexual
consideration" when imposed as a condition of employment for per-
sons of one sex can create "an artificial barrier to employment" which
operates to discriminate against such persons.9 The employee's charge
was sustained and back pay was ordered, though reinstatement was
denied."
The result reached by the court in Williams is contrary to decisions
rendered by other federal courts in sexual harassment cases." It is
instructive, therefore, to review the language of Title VII and its
judicial interpretation to determine whether the analysis made by the
Williams court was based on proper authority.12
7. Id. Initially an Equal Employment Opportunity officer investigated the complaint
pursuant to 5 C.F.R. § 713.216 (1977) (regulations of the Civil Service Commission). The
Civil Service Commission then sent the transcript of the Hearing Officer's decision to
the Complaint Adjudication Officer of the Department of Justice, pursuant to 5 C.F.R.
713.222 (1977). The case was remanded to reallocate the burden of proof. The claimant
had to present a prima facie case of sex discrimination in order to shift the burden to the
government to affirmatively establish the absence of discrimination by a clear weight of
the evidence. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. at 656, citing Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F.
Supp. 1247, aff'd sub nom. Hackley v. Roudebush, 520 F.2d 108 (D.C. Cir. 1975). On
remand, the Hearing Officer found that the agency did not meet its burden and rendered
judgment for the complainant. The Complaint Adjudication Officer concluded, howev-
er, that the charge did not constitute sex discrimination as defined by Title VII and
reversed. The District Court for the District of Columbia, on review, determined that the
Complaint Adjudication Officer's decision was erroneous because he did not establish
what standards he relied upon, nor how the burden of proof was allocated.
8. 413 F. Supp. at 655-68. Upon review of the administrative record the district court
found proof implying discrimination. Although the record produced little more than a
prima facie case of sex discrimination, this was sufficient for sustaining the plaintiff's
motion for summary judgment. The defendant failed to establish by a clear weight of the
evidence that the alleged causal connection between the plaintiff's poor work perform-
ance and the subsequent discharge was not a mere pretext for an action that was
motivated by arbitrary class prejudice. Thus, the court denied the defendant's motion
for summary judgment. Id.
9. 413 F. Supp. at 657.
10. 12 EMPL. PRACTICE DEC. 4763 (D.D.C. 1976). In a subsequent hearing held to
consider the question of remedies, the plaintiff was found to be entitled to full monetary
relief. Reinstatement was denied on the grounds that her former position no longer
existed. Id. at 4764. Refusal to grant reinstatement because the internal structure of the
agency has been reorganized "is the way you fire people in the government" according
to Washington, D.C. attorney Linda Singer. See Bralove, Cold Shoulder-Career Women
Decry Sexual Harassment by Bosses and Clients, WALL ST. J., Jan. 29, 1976, at 18, col.
1.
1I. See cases cited note 3 supra.
12. The Williams court distinguished Geduldig v. Aiello, a case that held that the
California Unemployment Insurance Code, which did not extend protection to pregnant
employees, was not in violation of constitutional standards. Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F.
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TITLE VII
Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196413 established a comprehen-
sive federal law to assure equality of employment opportunity 4 by
making unlawful those employment practices that discriminate on the
basis of race, color, sex, national origin, or religion." Discrimination
on the basis of sex is forbidden by the terms of the Act except where
an employer can prove that "sex . . . is a bona fide occupational
qualification reasonably necessary to the normal operation of the par-
ticular business enterprise.' ' 6
Although the Act proscribes sex discrimination, it does not define its
parameters.' 7 One of the threshold questions in Title VII sex discrimi-
Supp. at 660. Geduldig was not relied upon because it arose under the equal protection
clause of the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution and because there was "no risk
from when men are protected and women are not." Id. at 666, citing Geduldig v. Aiello,
417 U.S. 484, 496-97 (1974); Barnes v. Costle, 15 FEP Cases 353 n. 68 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2000e-15 (1970).
14. Federal employees were drawn within the scope of the Act by a series of
amendments known as the Equal Employment Opportunity Act of 1972, 42 U.S.C. §§
2000e-2000e-17 (Supp. IV 1974).
15. Id. at § 2000e-2(a) (1970).
(a) It shall be an unlawful employment practice for an employer-(1) to fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any individual, or otherwise to
discriminate against any individual with respect to his compensation, terms,
conditions, or privileges or employment, because of such individual's race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin; or
(2) to limit, segregate, or classify his employees or applicants for em-
ployment in any way which would deprive or tend to deprive any individual
of employment opportunities or otherwise adversely affect his status as an
employee, because of such individual's race, color, religion, sex, or national
ongin.
16. Id. at § 2000e-2(e) (1970). The Supreme Court has not defined the scope of the
"bona fide occupational qualification" exception. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
400 U.S. 542 (1971). The lower courts, however, have interpreted it narrowly. E.g.,
Rosenfeld v. Southern Pac. Co., 444 F.2d 1219 (9th Cir. 1971); Bowe v. Colgate-
Palmolive Co., 416 F.2d 711 (7th Cir. 1969); Weeks v. Southern Bell Tel. & Tel. Co., 408
F.2d 228 (5th Cir. 1969). Under the terms of the Act, the bona fide occupational
qualification defense is available to employers only for decisions involving the refusal to
hire and employ. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(e) (1970).
17. Therefore, the courts must analyze the scope of the statutory prohibition on a
case-by-case basis. Considerable deference has been given to the guidelines of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission. E.g., Trafficante v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co.,
407 U.S. 205, 210 (1972). Contra, General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
Standards developed in race discrimination cases are often applied. E.g., Griggs v. Duke
Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971). Furthermore, there is little reliance on legislative
history. E.g., Diaz v. Pan Am. Airways, Inc., 442 F.2d 385, 386 (5th Cir. 1972). See
generally Belton, Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964: A Decade of Private Enforce-
ment and Judicial Development, 20 ST. Louis U. L.J. 225, 276-77 (1976); Note, Devel-
opments in the Law-Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964, 84 HARV. L. REV. 1109, 1167 (1971); Note, Classification on the Basis of Sex and
the 1964 Civil Rights Act, 50 IowA L. REv. 778, 791-92 (1965). It is unclear whether, and
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nation cases is whether a term or condition of employment is applied
only to persons of one gender. 18 The most obvious case of sex discrimi-
nation occurs when gender is the primary variable in the classification
made by the employer. 19 Such a case occurs when an employer refuses
to hire any woman for a certain position. Similarly, sex discrimination
exists when an employer makes a decision to hire, discharge or impose
a condition of employment contingent on a characteristic peculiar to
one sex. 20 The refusal to hire a pregnant woman is illustrative of this
form of discriminatory treatment. 21 In short, per se unlawful employ-
ment practices occur whether an employer bases his actions upon
unsubstantiated sexual stereotypes22 or upon valid factual data based
on the intrinsic differences between men and women. Thus, employ-
ment opportunities that would be the same but for a person's gender
constitute Title VII violations. 23
When a non-gender related factor is applied only to employees of
one sex, it may operate as a smokescreen for discriminatory employ-
under what circumstances, courts will look to standards developed in cases that arose
under the fourteenth amendment to the Constitution. E.g., General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert,
429 U.S. 125 (1976).
18. Prior to the Supreme Court ruling in Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S.
542 (1971), some courts distinguished between employer practices that discriminated
solely on the basis of sex and those practices that incorporated non-gender related
factors as well. E.g., Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 416 F.2d 1257, 1260 (5th Cir.
1969), aff'd per curiam, 400 U.S. 542 (1971); Cooper v. Delta Airlines, Inc., 274 F. Supp.
781 (E.D. La. 1967).
19. Note, Sex Discrimination in Employment: An AttempFto Interpret Title VII of the
Civil Rights Act of 1964, 1968 DUKE L.J. 671, 688-94; Note, Developments in the Law-
Employment Discrimination and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L.
REV. 1109, 1170 (1971).
20. 413 F. Supp. at 658.
21. During the past decade there have been many Title VII cases concerning the way
employers treat women who are pregnant. Among the types of policies challenged are
those that exclude pregnancy from company disability benefit plans. In a recent decision
the Supreme Court held that exclusion of pregnancy from such plans does not violate
Title VII. General Elec. Co. v. Gilbert, 429 U.S. 125 (1976).
22. Traditional characterizations about female workers are often not supported by
factual data. One common stereotype is that a woman's primary commitment is to her
family and not to her job. On the basis of this belief, employers often conclude that
women have a high rate of absenteeism. See, e.g., U.S. CIVIL SERVICE COMM'N,
unpublished data, cited in U.S. DEP'T OF LABOR, WAGE AND LABOR STANDARDS ADMIN-
ISTRATION; WOMEN'S BUREAU, FACTS ABOUT WOMEN'S ABSENTEEISM AND LABOR TURN-
OVER 6 (1969); U.S. DEP'T OF HEALTH, EDUCATION AND WELFARE, PUBLIC HEALTH
SERVICE, VITAL AND HEALTH STATISTICS CURRENT ESTIMATES FROM THE HEALTH SUR-
VEY, Tables 8 and 16 (May 1969). Older studies point out the purported role that the
menstrual cycle plays in determining female behavior patterns. E.g., L. ISCARD, LA
FEMME PENDANT LA PERIOD MENSTRUELLE (1890).
23. See note 14 supra.
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TITLE VII
ment practices. 24 Sex-neutral traits such as parental25 or marital status26
ostensibly can be used as non-discriminatory criteria for making em-
ployment decisions, even though applied only to persons of one sex.
Conduct such as criminal activity 27 and heterosexual28 or interracial
fraternization 29 can also be weighed as neutral components of an em-
ployer's decision.
The theory, often referred to as "sex-plus," that discrimination on
the basis of sex does not occur when sex-neutral criteria in addition to
gender provide the basis for employment decisions, 30 has generally
been rejected. In Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp.,31 the Supreme
Court, in a per curiam decision, held that a policy that prohibited the
hiring of women with pre-school age children violated section 703(a).32
24.
It is abundantly clear that one purpose of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 is to
guarantee equal job opportunity for males and females. Much has been written
upon the subject of so-called "sex-plus" discrimination. In the final analysis, isn't
this but a shorthand way of saying that the national purpose cannot be circumvent-
ed by lip service adherence to the Civil Rights Act while thwarting its purpose
through the application of employment standards, to male and female alike, which,
in application deny employment to one sex or the other?
Smith v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 10 EMPL. PRAC. DEC. 5884, 5886 (N.D. Ga. 1975).
25. Sometimes parents of illegitimate children are excluded from jobs. This usually
has a more burdensome effect on mothers, as fathers can easily conceal the fact of
fatherhood. Statistics show that such policies have a disproportionate effect on Black
women. EEOC Dec. No. 71-562, 3 FEP Cases 233 (1970); EEOC Dec. No. 71-332, 2 FEP
Cases 1016 (1970).
26. See, e.g., Edwin Wiegand Co. v. Jurinko, 414 U.S. 970 (1973), vacated and
remanded, 497 F.2d 403 (3d Cir. 1974), remanded, 528 F.2d 1214 (3d Cir. 1975); Sprogis
v. United Air Lines, Inc. 308 F. Supp. 959 (N.D. I1. 1970), aff'd, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971). But see Gerstle v. Continental Airlines, Inc., 358
F. Supp. 545 (D. Colo. 1973); EEOC Dec. No. 72-0037, 4 FEP Cases 253 (1971).
27. See, e.g., McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973); EEOC Dec.
No. 73-0257, 5 FEP Cases 963 (1972).
28. EEOC Dec. No. 71-2678, 4 FEP Cases 24 (1971) (charging party was terminated
for having an "affair" with a male employee. The latter was not even disciplined).
29. EEOC Dec. No. 71-1902, 3 FEP Cases 1244 (1971) (Caucasian woman allegedly
fired because she was suspected of engaging in criminal activities. The Equal Opportuni-
ty Commission Hearing Officer determined that the fact that she was dating a Black
employee was at least a factor in the discharge.). EEOC Dec. No. 71-909, 3 FEP Cases
269 (1970) (Caucasian complainant alleged and proved that he was discharged because he
fraternized with Black employees.).
30. See note 17 supra.
31. 400 U.S. 542 (1971).
32. Id. See generally, 22 CATH. U.L. REV. 441 (1973). The case was remanded for an
evidentiary hearing to give the company an opportunity to show that the causal relation-
ship could be established between conflicting family obligations and a woman s job
performance. In allowing the employer to show that this was a circumstance where sex
was a bona fide occupational qualification, the Court avoided a resolution of the proper
1977]
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The Court determined that where an otherwise valid criterion is ap-
plied only to persons of one sex, the anti-discrimination provisions of
Title VII are triggered. 33
Although the Supreme Court discredited the sex-plus theory, some
courts still adhere to it in sexual harassment cases.3 4 The sexual adv-
ances are deemed to be neutral criteria used in making employment
decisions. These courts allow the employer to rely on the sex-neutral
criteria in order to negative the existence of a prima facie case of sex
discrimination. 35 In Tomkins v. Public Service Electric & Gas Co.,36
the New Jersey District Court determined that when a female employ-
ee is sexually harassed by a male supervisor, the gender of the employ-
ee is "incidental to the claim of abuse." 37 Thus, the court determined
that sexual advances made by a male supervisor towards persons of
one gender do not fall within the ambit of Title VII.38
issue. The Court relied on stereotypes of women as mothers, rather than on the requisite
standards for job performance for individual applicants. The impact of the Phillips case
is weakened, because the Court found that an exception could be made, even though
discrimination was proven.
In a concurring opinion, Justice Marshall stated: "I fear that in this case . . . the
Court has fallen into the trap of assuming that the Act permits ancient canards about the
proper role of women to be a basis for discrimination." 400 U.S. at 545.
33. The Seventh Circuit recognized that a no-marriage policy that was applied exclu-
sively to female stewardesses constituted discriminatory treatment based on gender
rather than on marital status as male employees had the freedom to marry. The case,
however, was remanded for consideration of whether the employer policy came within
the bona fide occupational qualification exception to the Act. 400 U.S. at 544. See
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991
(1971).
34. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976); Barnes
v. Train, 13 FEP Cases 123 (D.D.C. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Barnes v. Costle, 15 FEP
Cases 345 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
35. Belton, supra note 17 at 254-57. Relief is available only if the plaintiff makes a
prima facie showing that the employer has engaged in an unlawful employment practice.
If the complainant does not make a prima facie showing that discrimination has oc-
curred, the inquiry is over. Upon a sufficient showing the burden shifts to the employer
to articulate a legitimate, non-discriminatory motive for his actions. See McDonnell
Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802-04(1973). Business necessity is a judicially
created defense that must be affirmatively pleaded and proven by the defendant. An
exception can be made to the anti-discrimination provisions of Title VII when there is a
high correlation between a particular employment practice and the efficient running of a
business. Belton, supra note 17, at 254-57.
36. 422 F. Supp 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
37. Id. at 576.
38. In Barnes v. Train, 13 FEP Cases 123 (D.D.C. 1974), the District Court for the
District of Columbia suggested that the abolition of the plaintiff's position and her
[Vol. 14:251
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The holding of the court in Williams is consistent with the rejection
of the theory that sex-neutral criteria applied to persons of one gender
may negative charges of sex discrimination. 39 The court found that the
employee had rejected the sexual advances of her supervisor and that
her subsequent discharge was a retaliatory measure. 40 Judge Richey
held that a requirement of "willingness to furnish sexual con-
sideration" comes within the purview of the statutory proscription
against sex discrimination. 41
The court in Williams was unwilling to limit the scope of sex dis-
crimination to "sexual stereotyping" because neither the statutory
language nor the legislative history indicated a congressional intent to
do so. 42 Furthermore, it was not necessary under section 717(a)43 of the
Act to establish that a discriminatory policy was contingent upon a
characteristic peculiar to one sex. 44 In addition, the court rejected the
defendant's theory that the primary variable in the allegedly dis-
criminatory classification must be the employee's gender, rather than
the sexual preference of the employer.45 Judge Richey pointed out that
although "a finding of discrimination could not be made if the super-
visor were a bisexual and applied this criteria [sic] [of willingness to
furnish sexual consideration] to both genders," this result would not
preclude the conclusion that sex discrimination could not occur when
subsequent transfer did not constitute Title VII sex discrimination. However, the court
of appeals reversed the district court and held that defendant's conduct constituted sex
discrimination under Title VII. Barnes v. Costle, 15 FEP Cases 345 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
39. Barnes v. Costle, 15 FEP Cases 345, 353 (D.C. Cir. 1977).
40. 413 F. Supp. 654, 657 (D.D.C. 1976). The United States Department of Justice,
maintained that the employee's discharge was the result of her inadequate work perform-
ance, rather than a retaliatory measure. Id. at 656.
41. Id. at 659.
42. Id. at 658. The legal standard articulated by the Equal Employment Opportunity
Commission requires that women be considered on an individual basis and not according
to characteristics generally attributed to one group. 29 C.F.R. § 1604.2(a)-(1)(ii) (1976).
43. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-16(a) (Supp. V 1975).
44. 413 F. Supp. at 658. See Phillips v. Martin Marietta Corp., 400 U.S. 542 (1971);
Sprogis v. United Air Lines, Inc., 444 F.2d 1194 (7th Cir. 1971).
45. 413 F. Supp. at 659 n.6.
It is also notable that since the statute prohibits discrimination against men as well
as women, a finding of discrimination could be made where a female supervisor
imposed the criteria [sic] of the instant case only upon male employees in her
office. So could a finding of discrimination be made if the supervisor were a
homosexual. And, the fact that a finding of discrimination could not be made if the
supervisor were a bisexual and applied this criteria [sic] to both genders should not
lead to a conclusion that sex discrimination could not occur in other situations
outlined above.
Id.
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the supervisor was either heterosexual or homosexual. 46 In short, the
court refused to adopt the defendant's theory that sexual favors sol-
icited from women were only sex-neutral criteria, rather than employ-
ment practices that discriminate against women. The court relied on a
literal reading of Title VII in holding that the retaliatory actions of a
male supervisor taken because a female employee declines his sexual
advances, constitute sex discrimination under the Act.47
The scope of Title VII is limited to discriminatory practices that are
effected by dn employer or his agent. 8 Although there is a consensus
of opinion that an employer is responsible for the acts of his super-
visor,49 the courts that have considered the issue of Title VII discrimi-
nation within the context of sexual harassment have disagreed about
whether such actions are employment related.50 For example, in Come
v. Bausch and Lomb, Inc. ,51 the Arizona District Court reasoned that
sexual advances made by male supervisors toward female subordi-
nates merely represented the personal proclivities of the individuals
involved. 2 Thus, under this line of reasoning sexual advances do not
constitute a violation of Title VII since such actions are found not to be
employment related.
Another subject of dispute in Title VII cases centers on whether the
sexual harassment of an employee is part of a company policy. In
Miller v. Bank of America,53 the District Court of Northern California
held that the employer was not responsible for the actions of its
supervisor because the bank had a policy of discouraging such miscon-
duct. The court reasoned that because the supervisor's conduct arose
46. Id.
47. The only words in the statute related to the definition of sex discrimination are
"sex" and "bona fide occupational qualification." Congress did not intend to limit
discrimination on the basis of sex to those employer practices based solely on sex.
Senator McClennan proposed an amendment to Title VII on June 15, 1964, whereby the
work "solely" would have been inserted before the proscribed categories of discrimina-
tion. This proposal was rejected. 110 CONG. REc. 13838 (1964).
48. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e (1964).
49. See note 3 supra. The great weight of Title VII cases hold that an employer is
responsible for the acts of supervisory personnel. E.g., Ostapowicz v. Johnson Bronze
Co., 369 F. Supp. 522, 537 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Fekete v. United States Steel Corp., 353 F.
Supp. 1177 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
50. Tomkins v. Public Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553, 556 (D.N.J. 1976);
Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654, 660 (D.D.C. 1976).
51. 390 F. Supp. 161, 163 (D. Ariz. 1975).
52. Id.
53. 418 F. Supp. 233 (N.D. Cal. 1976).
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outside the scope of his employment the bank could not be held
liable.54
By focusing on the question of whether sexual harassment is em-
ployment related and part of a company policy, many courts are
sidestepping the critical issue of whether the economic coercion ac-
companying an implicit threat by a supervisor to terminate employ-
ment applied to persons of one sex because of a failure to provide
sexual favors, constitutes sex discrimination.5 5 While Title VII may
afford legal protection to men in the event that such a condition of
employment is imposed upon them, 56 a brief survey of the employment
market place leads to the conclusion that the consequences of condi-
tioning employment on a willingness to furnish sexual consideration
weigh more heavily on women. 7 In the context of the tradition of
relations between men and women, sexual favors will most likely be
requested by a male. Since men generally occupy positions of authori-
ty, women who decline to furnish sexual favors frequently suffer
economic disadvantages.5 8
Many of the courts hearing sexual harassment cases refuse to find
Title VII violations because they are concerned with opening up the
floodgates of litigation to admit insubstantial claims which might leave
employers defenseless against spurious charges of sex discrimina-
tion.5 9 Judge Stern in Tomkins stated that an "invitation to dinner
54. The court's reasoning was influenced by the fact that the plaintiff had not availed
herself of the personnel service in the bank which would have investigated the matter.
Id. at 235-36. The inference was that the bank, had this been undertaken, would have
had the opportunity to discipline the wrongdoer and prevent the occurrence of adverse
employment consequences. Id.
55. Tomkins v. Pub. Ser. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
56. See, e.g., Utility Workers Union v. Southern Cal. Edison Co., 320 F. Supp. 1262
(C.D. Cal. 1970).
57. See notes 1-2 supra and accompanying text.
58. The plaintiff in Williams was employed at the Community Relations Service of
the United States Department of Justice. In that department, 100% of the supervisors are
male and the overwhelming majority of the support staff is female. Memorandum in
Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss at 10, Williams v. Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654
(D.D.C. 1976). The plaintiff alleged that there was a policy at the Community Relations
Service "of imposing a condition of sexual submission on the female employees." Id. at
660 n.8.
59. In general, women are thought to be prone to lying in matters of sexual concern.
H. DEUTSCH, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF WOMEN, 132 (1944); H. SAUL, EMOTIONAL MATURITY,
92 (1942); Bartlett, Social Factors in Recall, in READINGS IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 69, 75
(T. Newcomb & L. Hartley ed. 1947); Note, The Victim in a Forcible Rape Case: A
Feminist View, 61 CALIF. L. REV. 919 (1973); Note, Rape and Rape Laws: Sexism in
Society and Law, 43 IOWA L. REV. 140 (1974). Women are said to silently solicit sexual
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could become an invitation to a federal lawsuit if a once harmonious
relationship turned sour at a later time.'' 6 These courts would be
justifiably concerned with affording adequate protection to employers
if the Act did not already provide a means for doing so. 6' For example,
in the case of a refusal by an employer to hire, transfer or discharge an
employee, the employer has the opportunity to prove that the decision
was based on the employee's poor work performance or on the appli-
cant's lack of job qualifications. 62 Simply put, it appears that the courts
are placing more weight on possible judicial inconvenience than on the
stated purpose of Title VII. 63
The result reached in Williams v. Saxbe supports the right of all
employees to work and receive financial compensation without having
to provide sexual favors. The District Court for the District of Colum-
bia has determined that sexual harassment of a female employee by a
male supervisor constitutes sex discrimination within the scope of Title
VII. 64 It is important that courts construe Title VII in this manner so
that employers and supervisors will know that sexual misconduct
advances while verbally denying them. M. AMIR, PATTERNS IN FORCIBLE RAPE (1971);
Slovenko, A Panoramic View: Sexual Behavior and the Law, in SEXUAL BEHAVIOR AND
THE LAW 551 (R. Slovenko ed. 1965). Amir, Victim Precipitation-Forcible Rape, 58
CRIMINOLOGY & POLrITCAL Sci. 493 (1968); Fox and Scherl, Crisis Intervention and
Victims of Rape, 1972 Soc. WORK 42.
The rationale behind the assumption that false accusations of sex crimes are more
frequent than untrue charges of other crimes underlies the belief that women will falsely
accuse their employers of retaliatory motives for their discharge. Note, Corroborating
Charges of Rape, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1137, 1138 (1967).
60. 422 F. Supp. 553, 557 (D.N.J. 1976).
61. See note 15 supra.
62. In Williams, however, the bona fide occupational qualification defense and the
judicially created business necessity exception were not available. In legitimate business
concerns it would not be possible, for example, to draw sexual advances into the
business necessity exception. This would be equivalent to requiring the government in all
future employment notices to include the following postcript:
NOTE-To all applicants-In addition to job requirements cited above, you are
informed that you may be required as a condition of any promotions or advance-
ments, or to your continued employment, that you submit to all sexual advances
made by your supervisor on his request and at his request.
Memorandum in Opposition to Defendant's Motion to Dismiss, Oct. 10, Williams v.
Saxbe, 413 F. Supp. 654 (D.D.C. 1976).
63. See note 14 supra.
64. See note 3 supra.
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occurring during the course of employment will not be judicially con-
doned.65
Edith Netter
65. Title VII is the exclusive judicial remedy for federal employment discrimination
to which Title VII extends. But in areas not covered by Title VII other remedies are not
affected. Brown v. Gen. Servs. Admin., 425 U.S. 820 (1976). Other theories may provide
the basis for litigation in sexual harassment cases. The New Hampshire Supreme Court
held that there was a breach of an employment contract for an indefinite period of time
when an employer, acting through his agent, maliciously discharged a female employee.
Monge v. Beebe Rubber Co., 114 N.H. 130, 316 A.2d 549 (1974). In addition, sexual
harassment may give rise to a civil action in tort, where the employer uses physical
force. Lastly, the penal statutes of the relevant jurisdiction may be found to be applica-
ble. Tomkins v. Pub. Serv. Elec. & Gas Co., 422 F. Supp. 553 (D.N.J. 1976).
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